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U.C.C. FILINGS: CHANGING 
CIRCUMSTANCES CAN MAKE A 
RIGHT FILING WRONG. BUT 
CAN THEY MAKE A 
WRONG FILING RIGHT? 
DAVID FRISCH* 
A secured party who wishes to perfect an Article 91 security interest by 
filing must file a proper financing statement in the correct office.2 If a 
security interest is perfected, changing circumstances, such as a lapse in 
time after a change in the location of the collateral, may transform the 
perfected security interest into an unperfected one.3 Consequently, the 
security interest, much to the dismay of the secured party, will be sub-
ject to all the deficiencies of an unperfected interest. But, under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, can the converse be true? That is, for ex-
ample, can an unperfected security interest, unperfected because the 
financing statement was initially filed in the wrong location, be per-
fected when circumstances change so that the filing is consequently 
made in the correct office (j.e., the office in which future filings would 
be made). 
This Article argues that filings, initially ineffective, should be 
deemed effective and hence should perfect the security interest if a 
• Associate Professor of Law, Delaware Law School. J.D. 1975, University of Miami; 
LL.M. 1980, Yale University. The author expresses his sincere appreciation to Professor Fairfax 
Leary, Jr. for his suggestions in the preparation of this Article. The author also wishes to ac-
knowledge, with thanks, the assistance of James Holzinger, a member of the class of 1983, Dela-
ware Law School. 
I. U.C.C. Article 9 (1978) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.]. All references and citations in this 
Article to the text and comments of the U.C.C. are to the 1978 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2. A security interest may also be perfected by possession. U.C.C. § 9-305. Certain types of 
security interests can be temporarily or permanently perfected without filing or possession. U.C.C 
§§ 9-302(1), -304(4), (5), -321(2). 
3. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-103 (l)(d) (change in location of collateral if action required by Part 
3 of Article 9); § 9-401 (Alternative Subsec. (3)) (intercounty change in the location of the collat-
eral, debtor's residence, or debtor's place of business). 
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change in circumstances would make the original filing effective if it 
were filed after the change. 
I. BACKGROUND: FILING LOCATION AND CONTENT 
The correct office for filing purposes, though of critical importance 
to the secured party,4 can be difficult to determine.5 The choice de-
pends on the U.C.C.'s response to two questions: (1) in which state 
must a :financing statement be filed, and (2) where in the proper state 
must a filing be made. The answer to the first question is found in the 
conflict-of-laws rules of U.C.C. section 9-103.6 This section is divided 
into six subsections, each of which contains the conflict-of-laws provi-
sion for a particular kind of collateral.7 The primary rule, however, is 
4. If the secured party files in the wrong place or not in all the places required by the 
U.C.C., the security interest will remain unperfected. The general rule is: "Except as otherwise 
provided by this Act a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, 
against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors." U.C.C. § 9-201. Despite the general 
rule, an unperfected security interest is unenforceable against most third parties because the 
number of exceptions to the general rule have in fact gobbled up the rule. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-
301 (list of persons who take priority over an unperfected security interest);§ 9-312(5) (conflicting 
unperfected security interests are given priority based on time of attachment). 
Although an improper filing can never perfect a security interest, it can be effective against 
certain third parties because "[a] filing which is made in good faith in an improper place or not in 
all of the places required ... is ... effective with regard to any collateral ... covered by the 
financing statement against any person who has knowledge of the contents of such financing state-
ment." U.C.C. § 9-401(2). For cases interpreting this provision, see In re Davidoff, 35 I F. Supp. 
440, 443-44 (D.N.Y. 1972); In re Komfo Prods. Corp., 247 F. Supp. 229, 239 (D. Pa. 1965); In re 
King Furniture City, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 453, 457 (D. Ark. 1965); In re Babcock Box Co., 200 F. 
Supp. 80, 81 (D. Mass. 1961); In re Luckenbill, 156 F. Supp. 129, 131-32 (D. Pa. 1957); Chrysler 
Credit Corp. v. Bank of Wiggins, 358 So. 2d 714, 717 (Miss. 1978); In re Enark Indus., Inc., 86 
Misc. 2d 985, 987 (1976). 
S. A rough estimate of the number of cases involving an allegedly misfiled financing state-
ment reported in U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) exceeds 200. 
6. The 1972 revision of the U.C.C. substantially modified§ 9-103 and deleted the choice of 
law clause of§ 9-102. For discussions of the conflict-of-laws rules under U.C.C. Article 9 (1962) 
[hereinajler cited as the Old Code], see generally Vernon, Recorded Chai/el Security Interests in the 
Cot!/fict of Laws, 41 IOWA L. REV. 346, 376-79 (1962) (discussing the ambiguities of the Old Code); 
Weintraub, Choice of Law in Secured Personal Property Transactions: The Impact of Article 9 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 MICH. L. REV. 683, 691-718 (1970) (discussing applications of 
Old Code and advocating improvements in the Old Code). 
7. The six categories of collateral are: (1) documents, instruments, and ordinary goods; 
(2) goods covered by a certificate of title; (3) accounts, general intangibles, and mobile goods; 
(4) chattel paper; (S) minerals; and (6) uncertificated securities. U.C.C. § 9-103. For discussions of 
the conflict-of-laws rules under the U.C.C., see generally Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 477, 529-58 (1973) (presenting the theory behind the current Article 9 conflict-of-
law rules and expressing doubt as to the efficacy of the last event test); Kripke, The "Last Event" 
Test for Perfection of Security Interests Under Article 9 of the Unfform Commercial Code, SO 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 47, 47-75 (1975) (responding to contemporary criticism of the primary conflict-of-
laws rule and illustrating the proper application of the rule); Petit, Choice of Law Under Article 
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the "last event" test:8 
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, perfection and the 
effect of perfection or non-perfection of a security interest in collat-
eral are governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is 
when the last event occurs on which is based the assertion that the 
security interest is perfected or unperfected.9 
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Although this Article says very little that is novel about the last event 
test and section 9-103 in relation to the initial choice of filing location, 
both will be considered and relied upon to support the argument for 
perfection by changed circumstances. 
After the secured party resolves the "which state" question by ap-
plying section 9-103, he must determine the proper office or offices 
within the state in which to file the financing statement. Section 9-
401 ( l) offers each adopting state the choice of three alternative provi-
sions that fix the place to file. 10 Depending on the provision a state 
adopts, the answer to the "where in the state" question could depend 
on the debtor's place of residence or business, the location of the collat-
eral, or the use of the collateral. 11 
Once the secured party determines the proper office or offices in 
which to file, he must clear one further hurdle to ensure an effective 
filing. The financing statement must meet the sufficiency requirements 
of U.C.C. section 9-402(1), which states that a financing statement is 
sufficient if it gives: 
the names of the debtor and the secured party, is signed by the 
debtor, gives an address of the secured party from which information 
concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing ad-
dress of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or 
describing the items, of collateral.12 
Nine of the UCC, 7 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 641, 666-76 (1976) (examining U.C.C. § 9-103 and associ-
ated interpretation problems); Adams, The 1972 Official Text of the Un!form Commercial Code: 
Analysis of Conflict of Laws Provision, 45 Miss. L.J. 281, 315-63 (1974) (analyzing the effect of 
Mississippi law if the U.C.C. (1972) were adopted in that state). 
8. For an overview of the last event test, see infra text accompanying notes 78-100. 
9. u.c.c. § 9-103(l)(b). 
10. The first choice provides almost exclusively for a single central filing. U.C.C. § 9-401 
(First Alternative Subsec. (1)). Under the second option, central filing is again the basic rule, but 
unlike the first, a local filing is required if the collateral is farm related or consumer goods. U.C.C. 
§ 9-401 (Second Alternative Subsec. (1)). The third option is identical to the second but requires a 
local filing in addition to a central filing when a debtor is doing business in only one county of the 
state or if the debtor has no place of business within the state but resides in the state. U.C.C. § 9-
401 (Third Alternative Subsec. (1)). 
11. See supra note 10. 
12. U.C.C. § 9-402(1). Note, however, that "[a] financing statement substantially complying 
with the requirements of this section is effective even though it contains minor errors which are 
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Typically, the filing is effective and remains effective until these-
cured obligation has been satisfied. 13 The term "effective" indicates the 
filing immediately perfects a pre-existing security interest or it perfects 
the security interest immediately upon attachment. 14 This Article is not 
concerned with effective filings, however, but rather with ineffective 
ones. For purposes of this Article, an ineffective filing is one that does 
not seriously misleading." U.C.C. § 9-402(8). Thus, only minor deviations from the norm of§ 9· 
402 are permitted. See, e.g., In re Smith, 508 F.2d 1323, 1324-25 (5th Cir. 1975) (incomplete street 
address of debtor sufficient); Jn re Wilco Forest Mach., Inc., 491 F.2d 1041, 1045 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(use of a corporate name which no longer designated a separate corporate entity sufficient); Mid· 
Eastern Elecs., Inc. v. First Nat'! Bank of S. Md., 455 F.2d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 1970) (mistake in 
date of maturity of a debt obligation sufficient); Citizens Bank v. Ansley, 467 F. Supp. 5 I, 53-55 
(D. Ga. 1979) (use of "Ansley Farms" instead of debtor's true name, "E. Ansley,'' insufficient); In 
re Hammous, 438 F. Supp. 1143, 1153-54 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (signature ofonly one of two partners 
sufficient); In re Bosson, 432 F. Supp. 1013, 1015-18 (C.D. Conn. 1977) (financing statement suffi· 
cient when only husband signs even though title is in wife's name; however, security interest de· 
fective on other grounds); In re Reeco Elec. Co., 415 F. Supp. 238 passim (S.D. Me. 1976) (absence 
of debtor's corporate suffixes sufficient); In re Southern Supply Co. of Greenville, N.C., 405 F. 
Supp. 20, 22 (E.D. N.C. 1975) (fact that debtor named only as "Southern Supply Co.'' sufficient); 
Jn re Hollis, 301 F. Supp. I, 2-4 (C.D. Conn. 1969) (date of lien noted in security agreement, but 
not on form, sufficient); In re Cushman Bakery, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 897, 902-04 (D. 
Me. 1975) (disclosure of only the nominee or agent of principal creditor sufficient); In re Eichler, 9 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1406, 1406-07 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (use of informal trade name of 
debtor insufficient); In re Modern Eng'g & Tool, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 580, 587-89 
(Bankr. C.D. Conn. 1978) (use of term "inventory" to describe listed equipment sufficient); In re 
Skinner, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1286, 1287-92 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1977) (addition of 
debtor's trade name following his real name sufficient); Jn re James Well Enters., Inc., 21 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 900, 901-03 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1977) (insufficient to identify debtor by 
trade name instead of real name); In re Wayne's Olive Knoll Farms, Inc., 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1210, 1210-12 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1976) (continuation statement filed after statutory 
time period insufficieut); In re Raymond F. Sargent, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 583 
passim (Banke. C.D. Me. 1974) (absence of debtor's name insufficient); In re Brawn, 7 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 565, 578 (Bankr. Ref. C.D. Me. 1970) (error in mailing address of debtor 
insufficient); Jn re Bennett, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 994, 996 (Bankr. Ref. W.D. Mich. 
1969) (security agreement filed as a financing statement sufficient); In re Carlstrom, 3 U.C.C Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 766, 772 (Bankr. Ref. C.D. Me. 1966) (absence of secured party's signature 
insufficient); Jn re First State Bank of Nora Springs, Iowa, 183 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Iowa 1971) 
(wrong county used in describing location of real estate on which the items the financing state· 
ment covers sufficient); Southwest Bank of Omaha v. Moritz, 203 Neb. 45, 54, 277 N.W.2d 430, 
435 (1979) (absence of collateral owner's signature insufficient); Roberts v. International Harvester 
Credit Corp., 143 Ga. App. 206, 207, 237 S.E.2d 697, 698 (1977) (one word omission from lender's 
name sufficient); Samuel Breiter & Co. v. Domler Leasing Corp., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla· 
ghan) 1248, 1249-50 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (incorrect serial number of collateral sufficient). 
13. U.C.C. § 9-403(2). The filing's effectiveness, however, is limited to a period of five years 
from the date of filing unless a continuation statement is filed within six months prior to the 
expiration of that period. Id. 
14. It is quite possible that when the filing occurs the security interest will not have attached. 
Such an order of events is expressly sanctioned by the U.C.C. in that "(a] financing statement may 
be filed before a security agreement is made or a security interest otherwise attaches.'' U.C.C. § 9· 
402(1). See also U.C.C. § 9-303(1) ("A security interest is perfected when it has attached and 
when all of the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken.''). 
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not immediately perfect a pre-existing security interest, one that does 
not perfect the security interest immediately upon attachment, or one 
that was previously effective, but will no longer perfect the security in-
terest due to a change of circumstances. 15 To narrow the issue still fur-
ther, this Article is not concerned with the myriad of problems which 
inhere in making a determination of effectiveness or the results which 
flow from that determination. Instead, this Article focuses on whether 
an admittedly ineffective financing statement can be, and should be, 
cured16 by a change in conditions. 
II. ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PROBLEM 
The issue addressed by this Article can best be illustrated by the follow-
ing hypotheticals: 
(1) Buyer enters into an installment contract for the purchase of 
a tractor (farm equipment). To secure the purchase price, Seller 
reserves a purchase money security interest. At the time of the 
purchase and delivery of the tractor, Buyer resides in County A. Nev-
ertheless, Seller files a financing statement in County B because Buyer 
represents to Seller his intention to relocate immediately in County B.17 
Buyer subsequently moves to County B, but after a short time moves 
back to County A and then to other counties. 18 
At the moment of filing, the financing statement was ineffective to 
perfect a security interest in favor of the Seller since it was not filed in 
the county in which Buyer resided.19 The filing would have remained 
15. An effective filing can become ineffective for a number of reasons. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-
103(l)(d) (interstate relocation of collateral); § 9-401 (Alternative Subsec. (3)) ("a change to an-
other county of the debtor's residence or place of business or the location of the collateral, which-
ever controlled the original filing"); § 9-402(7) (a filing will not perfect a security interest in after-
acquired collateral, acquired four months after certain name or organizational changes by the 
debtor); 9-403(2) (five year limitation on the effectiveness of an initial filing). 
16. The term cure has been used infrequently in this context. See, e.g., DeKoven, Uniform 
Commercial Code, Annual Survey: Secured Transacrions, 31 Bus. LAW 1011, 1034-36 (1982) (cure 
terminology used in context of changing circumstances and defective financing statement). Cure 
is the most accurate and concise term to describe whether subsequent events can validate an inef-
fective financing statement. 
17. A local filing may be required ifthe collateral is farm equipment. U.C.C. §§ 9-401 (Sec-
ond Alternative Subsec. (1)), (Third Alternative Subsec. (!)). 
18. The source of this not so hypothetical hypothetical is International Harvester Credit 
Corp. v. Vos, 95 Mich. App. 45, 48-50, 290 N.W.2d 401, 403-04 (1980). 
19. See U.C.C. §§ 9-401 (Second Alternative Subsec. (1)), (Third Alternative Subsec. (I)) 
(under both alternatives the proper place to file to perfect a security interest is in the county of 
debtor's residence if the collateral is farm _equipment). 
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ineffective if the Buyer continued to reside in County A.20 The ques-
tion, then, is whether the subsequent relocation of Buyer to County B 
cures the ineffective filing. 
(2) Debtor is a corporation with a place of business in only one 
county in the state. In need of a vast sum of money, Debtor contacts its 
favorite loan officer at the local bank. The loan officer agrees to the 
loan if it is secured by a security interest in all of the Debtor's assets. 
Debtor agrees and both a security agreement and financing statement 
are properly executed. The loan is made and the financing statement is 
then filed only with the Secretary of State. Subsequently, Debtor pros-
pers and expands its business throughout the state.21 
Since Debtor was initially doing business in only one county, a 
dual filing was required.22 Had Debtor been doing business in more 
than one county, however, only the single filing would have been re-
quired.23 Therefore, the singular filing with the Secretary of State was 
ineffective to perfect the bank's security interest. This hypothetical is 
similar to the previous one, except here the central filing was necessary 
but insufficient to perfect the bank's security interest. The question, 
once again, is not whether the initial filing was effective but whether a 
change in conditions can cure an admittedly ineffective filing. In this 
case, the change is the expansion of Debtor's business throughout the 
state. 
(3) Debtor is a corporation with the name ABC, Inc. It believes 
that its profit potential will be realized only by the infusion of addi-
tional cash. It contacts its favorite loan officer at the local bank and 
requests a loan. The loan officer insists that the loan be secured by a 
security interest in all of Debtor's assets. In addition, the loan officer 
points out that Debtor has received some negative publicity recently 
and suggests that Debtor change its name. Debtor agrees to the secur-
ity interest and also announces its intention to change its name to XYZ 
Co. The loan is made and Debtor executes all the necessary docu-
20. Under any test the filing in County B is initially ineffective. See iefra text accompanying 
notes 45-54. 
21. The source of this not so hypothetical hypothetical is Jn re G. G. Moss Co., rev'd. 3 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 777, ajf'd, No. 81-1818 (4th Cir. 1982). For similar fact patterns, 
see Genoa Nat'l Bank v. Sorensen, 208 Neb. 423, 424, 304 N.W.2d 659, 660-61 (1981 ); In re Kane, 
1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 582, 583-84 (E.D. Pa. 1962); In re Golden Kernel, Inc. 5 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 43, 44-45 (Bankr. Ref. E.D. Pa. 1968). 
22. U.C.C. § 9-401 (Third Alternative Subsec. (l)(c)). 
23. Id. 
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ments. The loan officer, aware of the imminent name change24 and the 
Code-imposed obligation of good faith,25 designates Debtor in the 
financing statement as XYZ Co.26 The financing statement is then filed 
in the proper offices. Some time later, Debtor changes its name to XYZ 
Co.21 
At the time of filing, the financing statement was ineffective and 
did not perfect the bank's security interest because Debtor, at the time 
of filing, was ABC, Inc., not XYZ Co., and, therefore, Debtor's name 
was not given. 28 Subsequently, however, Debtor changed its name to 
correspond with the name given in the financing statement. Although 
this hypothetical differs from the previous two in that the filing was 
originally made in the correct office, it nevertheless raises the identical 
issue: whether a change in conditions can cure an admittedly improper 
filing. 
(4) Debtor, while a resident of State A, grants a bank a security 
24. The Old Code did not require the filing of a new financing statement or an amendment if 
the identity of the debtor changed and, in general, the courts did not impose such an obligation on 
the secured party. E.g., In re GAC, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 412, 413 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 1972); In re The Grape Arbor, Inc., 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 632, 633 (Bankr. Ref. 
E.D. Pa. 1969); Continental Oil Co. v. Citizens Trust & Savings Bank, 397 Mich. 203, 208, 244 
N.W.2d 243, 244 (1976); In re Pasco Sales Co., 77 Misc. 724, 726, 354 N.Y.S.2d 402, 404 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1974). But see In re Kalamazoo Steel Process, Inc., 503 F.2d 1218, 1224 (6th Cir. 1974) 
(when secured creditor has knowledge of debtor's contemplated name change and does not perfect 
filing after name change, the secured creditor forfeits protected interest). 
In 1972, subsection (7) was added to U.C.C. § 9-402 which provides, in part: 
Where the debtor so changes his name or in the case of an organization its name, identity 
or corporate structure that a filed financing statement becomes seriously misleading, the 
filing is not effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor 
more than four months after the change, unless a new appropriate financing statement is 
filed before the expiration of that time. 
u.c.c. § 9-402(7). 
25. See U.C.C. § 1-203 ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of 
good faith in its performance or enforcement."). 
26. It is not suggested, and the reader should not assume, that the characters in these hy-
potheticals are practicing co=ercial law well. The fact that those hypotheticals are suggested by 
actual cases would attest otherwise. 
27. This not so hypothetical hypothetical with some modification is suggested by In re 
Kalamazoo Steel Process, Inc., 503 F.2d 1218, 1220 (6th Cir. 1974). 
28. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (name of debtor essential requirement of any financing state-
ment). The name of the debtor is important because the filing officer is required to index the 
financing statement under the debtor's name. U.C.C. § 9-403(4). Although the 1962 version of 
U.C.C. § 9-402(1) did not expressly require that the debtor's name be given in the financing state-
ment, courts uniformly held that the debtor's legal name had to appear so the statement could be 
filed and indexed in such a manner that a person searching the records under the debtor's legal 
name could locate it. E.g., K.N.C. Wholesale, Inc. v. Awmco, Inc., 56 Cal. App. 3d 315, 320, 128 
Cal. Rptr. 345, 350 (1976); White Star Distrib., Inc. v. Kennedy, 66 A.D. 2d 1011, 1011, 411 N.Y.S. 
2d 751, 752 (1978); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Terra Contractors Corp., 6 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 544, 547 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969). 
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interest in certain equipment located in State A. The bank files a 
financing statement in the proper office in State A. Debtor then moves 
the equipment to State B where it remains for a period of six months. 
The bank does not file a financing statement in State B. After the six-
month period, Debtor returns the equipment to State A.29 
When the financing statement was filed in State A, it was effective, 
and perfected the bank's security interest.30 When the collateral was 
moved to State B, the bank had four months within which to file a new 
financing statement in State B to continue its perfected status.31 Since 
it did not refile, bank's interest became imperfect at the expiration of 
the four-month period.32 The question raised by this hypothetical is 
whether the relocation of the collateral back into State A reperfected 
the bank's security interest and, hence, cured the original filing. 
Unlike the previous hypotheticals, the filing here was initially ef-
fective, and a change of conditions caused it to become ineffective. 
Yet, once the filing is deemed ineffective, the identical issue involving 
cure arises; the cure here being the relocation of the collateral back to 
State A. The issue does not change merely because the filing was origi-
nally effective. 
These hypotheticals, by illuminating the problems created by inef-
fective filings or unperfected security interests, will aid in the following 
analysis of cure. 
III. THE JUDICIAL APPROACH TO CURE 
In contrast to the change in conditions in hypotheticals (1) through (3), 
the change in hypothetical (4) involved the interstate relocation of the 
collateral. For analytical clarity, a discussion of cure by interstate relo-
cation of the collateral will be set out separately from the possibility of 
cure resulting from other changes.33 Let us now look at the way the 
29. The source of this not so hypothetical hypothetical isln re Miller, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1042, 1042-43 (Bankr. D. Or. 1974). For an excellent discussion of In re Miller, see 
Kripke, wpra note 7, at 51-60. 
30. See U.C.C. § 9-103(l)(b) ("perfection or non-perfection ofa security interest in collateral 
are governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is when the last event occurs on 
which is based the assenion that the security interest is perfected"). See also infra text accompa-
nying notes 78-88. 
31. See U.C.C. § 9-103(l)(d) (perfection continues until expiration of four months after col-
lateral is taken to new states unless earlier refiling is necessitated because perfection would have 
ceased by the law of the first jurisdiction). 
32. Id. 
33. When the change in circumstances involves interstate relocation of collateral, the use of 
the last event test is mandated if the collateral is ordinary goods, documents, or instruments. 
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courts have resolved or eliminated34 the issue of cure where there has 
been an interstate relocation of collateral. 
A. CURE INVOLVING INTERSTATE RELOCATION OF COLLATERAL 
In re Miller35 is the only reported case involving a question of cure by 
interstate relocation, although the court did not use the term when 
framing the issue. In re Miller involved facts similar to those of the 
fourth hypothetical.36 The debtor, while a resident of California, 
granted a security interest in certain equipment to a credit company. 
The credit company filed in California.37 The debtor then moved the 
collateral to Oregon and granted a security interest to a lender who 
filed in Oregon. The credit company never filed in Oregon where the 
collateral remained for more than four months. The collateral was 
then returned to California and the lender properly refiled there within 
four months. The debtor then went bankrupt. 
The court concluded that the credit company's originally perfected 
security interest lapsed after the collateral had been in Oregon longer 
than four months. Had the collateral remained there the lender's prior-
ity would have been unquestioned.38 The issue, then, was whether re-
turn of the equipment to California cured the lapsed filing of the credit 
company. The court declared that once a gap occurs, "the original 
perfection is not revived."39 
The court concluded that the trustee in bankruptcy took subject to 
the lender's security interest but not that of the credit company.40 It is 
not clear, however, whether the court believed that the credit com-
U.C.C. § 9-103(l)(b). When the change in circumstances does not involve interstate relocation of 
collateral, other tests have been used. See iefra text accompanying notes 54-66. The test selected 
to determine the places at which to file is important because only the last event test will allow for 
the recognition of cure. Id. 
34. If a court adopts the time of filing or time of attachment test to determine where to file a 
financing statement, a financing statement cannot be cured. Hence, courts which have adopted 
either test in effect have "eliminated" the issue. See iefra text accompanying notes 67-71. 
35. 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1042 (D. Ore. 1974). 
36. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32. 
37. The court assumed that the collateral was not customarily used in more than one juris-
diction so that the law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral was located governed perfection. 
14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1047-48, 1050. The court did state that its "conclusions ... 
in the present case would be the same under either [Old Code § 9-103(2)] or [Old Code § 9-
103(3)]." Id. at 1049. Although the case was decided under the Old Code, it is doubtful the court 
would have decided it differently under the U.C.C. Id. 
38. Id. at 1043. See Old Code§ 9-103(3) (regarding the need to refile within four months 
after interstate relocation of the collateral). 
39. Id. at 1046 (emphasis in original). 
40. Id. at 1047. 
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pany's security interest was re-perfected, but subordinated, or remained 
unperfected, when the collateral returned to California. Hence, the 
only legal proposition for which this case can stand is that, for the pur-
pose of priority, the return of the collateral to the original state of 
perfection does not revive the original date of filing.41 The court could 
have reached the identical result had it concluded that the credit com-
pany's security interest was re-perfected the moment the collateral was 
returned to California, but that for the purpose of a priority contest 
with the lender, the credit company's filing was deemed to date from 
the time the collateral re-entered California. Thus, the lien of the 
lender would continue to have priority.42 The interest of the credit 
company could still be subordinate to that of the trustee who would 
assert that the cured filing resulted in a voidable preference.43 Only a 
finding of re-perfection would be congruent with the recognition of 
cure. 
B. CURE NOT INVOLVING INTERSTATE RELOCATION OF 
COLLATERAL 
In 1981, the issue of cure not involving the interstate relocation of col-
lateral arose in two cases resulting in conflicting decisions. The first 
case, originally decided by the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia, was In re G. G. Moss Co. ,44 which involved facts simi-
lar to those of the second hypothetical.45 When the secured party first 
filed, two filings were required because the debtor had a place of busi-
ness in only one county within the state.46 The secured party filed both 
centrally and locally, but the local filing was made in the wrong county. 
After these initial filings, the debtor began a second business in a sec-
ond county. The secured party then filed an amendment to the central 
filing which added collateral.47 Although designated an amendment, 
41. Of course, this proposition assumes that the collateral did not return within four months 
after its removal. See U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(d) (expiration of the period of perfection takes place only 
when collateral is brought into and kept in the new state for the specified time). 
42. See infra text accompanying notes 122-27. 
43. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 60a-b (1970) {applicable sections at time case was decided); Kripke, 
supra note 7, at 50 n.15 (the fact that re-perfection occui:red within a few days before bankruptcy 
might !Jave allowed preference retention under the Bankruptcy Act). 
44. 9 Bankr. 47 (E.D. Va. 1981). 
45. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
46. Virginia had adopted the Third Alternative Subsection (I) of U.C.C. § 9-401 which re-
quires dual filing when a debtor has only one place of business in the state. VA. CooE § 8.9-401(1) 
(1965 added volume). 
47. A financing statement may be amended by filing a writing signed by both the debtor and 
the secured party. U.C.C. § 9-402(4). It is not clear why a secured party would include additional 
collateral by way of an amendment to an original filing instead of simply filing an additional 
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this later filing contained all the information required for a financing 
statement.48 It is clear, therefore, that: (1) the original filing did not 
perfect the security interest because the necessary local filing was not 
properly made, and (2) at the time the amendment was filed, only a 
central filing was required because the debtor had expanded its busi-
ness into a second county.49 
The bulk of the court's opinion was devoted to th~ issue of 
whether the amendment perfected the security interest. The court re-
fused to accept the secured party's argument that the opening of a sec-
ond place of business made a second filing unnecessary. The secured 
party had argued that the status of the initial central filing was elevated 
from one which was necessary but insufficient to one which was both 
necessary and sufficient to perfect the security interest once the debtor 
had expanded his business into a second county. On this latter point, 
the court concluded that: 
To subscribe to [the secured party's] position would create unin-
tended results. For example, if a company, which had but one loca-
tion improperly files only at the S.C.C. and not in the county or city 
of its business, it would be unperfected. But at the instance that it 
opened a second business, which would require filing only at the 
S.C.C., [the secured party's] logic would dictate that the security in-
terest would be perfected at that moment. The Code provides other-
wise and sound logic would also dictate otherwise .50 
The court never specified the applicable Code provision or explained 
why sound logic would dictate otherwise. The court concluded that the 
security interest was unperfected because an amendment "relates back 
to the original financing statement and cannot perfect a security inter-
est if the original was defective."51 The court's view rested solely on 
the theory that an amendment cannot perfect a security interest.52 
financing statement. An amendment will not extend the period of effectiveness of the original 
filing. Id. Thus, the initial period of perfection as to the new collateral will be less than five years. 
See U.C.C. § 9403(2) (''The effectiveness of a filed financing statement lapses on the expiration of 
the five year period unless a continuation statement is filed prior to the lapse."). If an additional 
financing statement is filed instead, the initial period of perfection will be five years. Id. For 
purposes of priority, it makes no difference whether an amendment or a new financing statement 
is filed. See U.C.C. § 9402(4) (in Article 9 "the term 'financing statement' means the original 
financing statement and any amendments"). 
48. 9 Bankr. at 50. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 51 (emphasis added). 
51. Id. 
52. The Moss court so interpreted the last sentence of U.C.C. § 9402(4) which reads: "In 
this Article, unless the context otherwise requires, the term 'financing statement' means the 
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The second case addressing the issue of cure was Genoa National 
Bank v. Sorensen ,53 which involved a secured party who originally took 
a security interest in growing crops. Although collateral of unharvested 
crops required a filing with the Public Service Commission,54 the se-
cured party failed to file with the Commission. The secured party did 
file, however, in the office of the county clerk, a filing which alone 
would have been sufficient if the collateral had been harvested by the 
debtor. 55 The issue, as in Moss, was whether the local filing, originally 
ineffective, became effective after the crops were harvested, thus 
perfecting the security interest at that time. 
In holding that the security interest had been perfected, the Soren-
sen court relied on the fact that a financing statement may be filed 
before a security interest attaches,56 stating: 
We therefore believe the better rule, and the one supported both by 
the language of the Uniform Commercial Code and logic, requires us 
to hold that if an otherwise unperfected lien is not filed at all the 
proper places at the time of filing, but through the passage of time or 
change in character of the property becomes a proper filing under the 
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the lien also becomes 
properly perfected and has superior rights over all other liens not 
otherwise perfected prior to the time that the previous security lien 
was perfected.57 
original financing statement and any amendments." Although an amendment can serve many 
purposes it cannot act as a financing statement. Had the court adopted the secured party's posi-
tion, however, this issue would have been moot. 
53. 208 Neb. 423, 304 N.W.2d 659 (1981). Disagreeing with only this portion of the court's 
opinion, the decision was subsequently reversed by the district court and the reversal affirmed by 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals "for the reasons sufficiently stated in the district court's opin-
ion." 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 777 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981), efd, No. 81-1818 (4th Cir. 
1982). The district court had reasoned that 
[t]here is no question that but for the fact that it was labeled as an "amendment," appel-
lant's 1976 filing fulfilled both the letter and spirit of Virginia's filing laws. Virginia is a 
notice filing state .... Appellant's 1976 filing gives adequate notice of its interest in the 
debtor's inventory. Its designation as an amendment is not seriously misleading in this 
context. Even more importantly, however, when considered by itself the filing also meets 
all the technical statutory requirements of a filing statement. 
Id. at 779. 
54. NER. REV. STAT. § 9-40l(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978). This is no longer the law in Nebraska. 
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-40l(l)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1980). 
55. 208 Neb. 423, 425-26, 304 N.W.2d 659, 661. 
56. u.c.c. § 9-402(1). 
57. 208 Neb. at 428-29, 304 N.W.2d at 663. In support of its ruling, the court theorized that 
the security interest first attached to the crops when they were harvested; the filing was simply 
made before the time of attachment. 208 Neb. at 428-29, 304 N.W.2d at 662-63. This reasoning 
appears to be convoluted and has been criticized by one commentator who states that: 
In the court's view, the security interest attached to the crops at the time they were har-
vested and the earlier filing perfected the security interest at that time. However, it 
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Hence, the Nebraska Supreme Court, unlike the Moss court, is of the 
opinion that an initially ineffective financing statement can be cured by 
a subsequent change in circumstances, at least where such change in-
volves a change in the character of the collateral. 
Prior to the Moss and Sorensen decisions, two other courts explic-
itly ruled on the possibility of cure when there is a change in circum-
stances. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Vos 58 involved facts 
identical to those of the first hypothetical, 59 where the secured party 
filed in a county other than where the debtor resided. The debtor sub-
sequently moved to the county where the filing was made. The trial 
court held that the security interest became perfected when the debtor 
relocated to the county in which the ineffective filing had been made. 
It reasoned that upon relocation there was "a 'unity' of the requisites of 
perfection, i.e., a security agreement, attachment and filing in the 
county of the debtor's residence, which 'cured' the misfiled financing 
statement and perfected plainti.ff s security interest."60 
The Michigan Court of Appeals, reversing the trial court's deci-
sion, concluded that "the county of the debtor's residence is the proper 
place for filing the financing statement, and should be determined at a 
specific moment in time."61 The court then ruled that the specific mo-
ment in time at which the debtor's residence must be determined is the 
moment the security interest first attaches. 62 In response to the trial 
would seem preferable to view the security interest as attaching at the time the agree-
ment was made, value was given, and the debtor had rights in the collateral, with subse-
quent perfection at the time the crops were harvested and the filing became ap_propriate 
to perfect an interest in them. Moreover, while the court raised no question as to 
whether the collateral was properly described and the exact descriptions in the security 
agreement and financing were not quoted, the court stated that "crops growing on land 
leased by" the debtor were collateral, which perhaps should have raised an issue as to 
whether harvested crops were included in the description, although harvested crops 
might ar~uably be proceeds of growing crops under § 9-306(1). Under § 9-306(1) die 
problem 1s whether stored crops are "proceeds" of "growing crops" within the statutory 
language of"whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition 
of collateral or proceeds." 
DeKoven, U.CC Survey: Secured Transaction, 37 Bus. LAW. 1034, 1036 n. 131 (1982). Hence, 
"[t)he problem may not have been as simple as the court reported." Id. 
Perhaps the court felt constrained to reason as it did. The court may have felt obligated to 
subscribe to the view that a determination of where to file is to be made at the time the security 
interest attaches. If this is true, then only by extending the point in time at which the interest 
attached could the court hold that the security interest was perfected. See i'!fi-a text accompanying 
notes 67-72. 
58. 95 Mich. App. 45, 290 N.W.2d 401 (1980). 
59. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18. 
60. 95 Mich. App. at 50, 290 N.W.2d at 403. 
61. Id. at 53, 290 N.W.2d at 405. 
62. Id. at 58, 290 N.W.2d at 408. 
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court's ''unity of factors" approach, the appellate court stated: 
By upholding plaintiffs priority of lien under a "unity of factors" 
analysis, the trial court holding perpetuates and encourages a busi-
ness practice which needlessly complicates, confuses, and impedes 
the law governing commercial transactions. To condition the perfec-
tion of a security interest upon the debtor's eventual residence in the 
county of filing results not in a floating lien, as contemplated by the 
UCC, but in a lien" 'drifting' in aimless and hazardous disregard of 
the rights of others necessarily navigating the same lanes of 
commerce. "63 
Another case dealing expressly with the possibility of cure is In re 
Kane .64 The facts are similar to those in Moss except that no amend-
ment was filed. As in International Harvester, the Kane court con-
cluded that "the filing requirements for perfection of the security 
interest were to be determined as of the time when the security interest 
attached . . . ."65 The court rejected the secured party's argument that 
when the debtors opened other places of business, the formerly insuf-
ficient filing became sufficient, concluding that "[p ]erfection could not 
be made to depend upon what the debtor subsequently does."66 
The U.C.C. does not state when the place of filing is to be deter-
mined. A resolution of this issue is necessary whenever there has been 
a change of circumstances between the time the security interest first 
attaches and the time of filing. Though related to the issue of cure, the 
two issues are not identical. The issue of cure necessarily presupposes a 
filing which is initially ineffective. The issue of when the relevant fac-
tors are determined for purposes of filing controls whether the initial 
filing is effective and, hence, whether the issue of cure can ever arise. 
The two issues are similar in that the test adopted by a court for deter-
mining initial effectiveness will ordinarily provide an answer to the 
question of cure. 
C. THREE TESTS FOR WHERE TO FILE AND THEIR 
EFFECT ON CURE 
The courts have used three different tests to determine the proper loca-
tion to file a financing statement. Some courts have used the "time of 
attachment" test. Under this test the facts existing at the time the se-
63. Id. at 52-53, 290 N.W.2d at 404-05 (citing In re Pelletier, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 327, 335 (D. Me. 1968)). 
64. I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 582 (E.D. Pa. 1962). 
65. I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 587. 
66. Id. 
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curity interest first attaches control the place of filing.67 For example, if 
the debtor resides in County A at the time the security interest first 
attaches, a filing would be proper in that county regardless of the 
debtor's place of residence at the time of filing.68 Kane and Interna-
tional Harvester demonstrate that the time of attachment test69 pre-
cludes the possibility of later cure because the proper place to file is 
determined at a particular moment in time and that place will not 
change regardless of later events. 
Other courts have opted for a "time of filing" test.70 Under this 
test, a creditor can safely ignore the facts existing at the time the secur-
ity interest first attaches and focus entirely on the facts existing when 
the filing is contemplated. For example, if the security interest first at-
taches when the debtor resides in County A, but if before a filing is 
made the debtor relocates to County B, the time of filing test would 
require a filing in County B.71 The application of this test also pre-
cludes the possibility of cure because the proper place to file is again 
determined at a particular moment in time, 1:e., the time of filing. 
Whatever occurs subsequent to the filing is irrelevant when making a 
determination of the filing's effectiveness. 
A third test, the "last event" test, dictates that the proper place to 
file is determined by the facts existing when the last event occurs upon 
which the perfection of the security interest is based. The use of the 
last event test is suggested by a comment to the U.C.C.: 
lf the Third Alternative subsection (I) is adopted, then local 
filing, in addition to the central filing, is required in all the cases 
67. See In re O'Donnell, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 888, 892 (D. Me. 1970) (security 
interest perfected by filing in municipality of debtor's residence at the time the security interest 
attached, notwithstanding debtor's relocation); In re Pelletier, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
327, 331 (D. Me. 1968) (requiring financing statement to be filed in municipality of debtor's per-
manent residence as of the date the security interest attaches); In re Kane, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 582, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (filing in wrong county does not perfect security interest even 
if debtor later does business there, because filing requirements are determined as of the time when 
the security interest attaches to the collateral). 
68. For numerous examples of the applications of the time of attachment rule, see generally 
Wallach, Perfecting and Reperfecting Security Interests Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 
Bus. LAW. 447, 450-51 (1975). 
69. For a brief application of the thne of attachment test (location of filing place determined 
as of the time the security interest attaches), see Wallach, supra note 68, at 451-52. 
70. In re Page, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 250, 252 (W.D. Ky. 1968). See In re Golden 
Kernel, Inc., 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 43, 47 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (single filing insufficient when 
debtor consolidated his place of business from two counties to one county between the time debtor 
ordered equipment and the time secured party filed). 
71. See Wallach, supra note 68, at 450-53 (illustrating use of time of filing test). 
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stated in the preceding paragraph, with respect to any debtor whose 
places of business within the state are all within a single county 
(township, etc.) or a debtor who is not engaged in business. The last 
event test stated in Section 9-JOJ(l)(b) and Comment thereto applies to 
determine whether local filing is required under the present section, as 
well as to determine in which stale filing is required.72 
If read literally, the comment calls for the application of the last event 
test only to determine, under the Third Alternative Subsection (1) of 
section 9-401, whether a local filing is required in addition to a central 
filing.73 
Although the comment does not suggest use of the last event test to 
determine where in the state the original filing should be made, one 
court has done so. In the case of In re Hammons 74 the security interest 
did not become perfected until the secured party gave value to the 
debtor and the debtor :ti.ad rights in the collateral, both of which oc-
curred when the secured party delivered part of the merchandise 
financed under the security agreement. At the time of delivery, the 
debtor was doing business in a different county from the county in 
which the financing statement had been filed. The Fifth Circuit corM 
reedy concluded that the issue was "at what time in the course of his 
dealings with a singleMplaceMofMbusiness debtor the creditor must deterM 
mine the proper county in which to make his local filing."75 The court 
rejected both the time of filing and time of attachment tests in favor of 
the last event test and held that the security interest was unperfected 
because the security party had failed to file in the county where the 
debtor was doing business when the last event, the delivery of merM 
chandise, occurred. Because there was no indication that the debtor 
ever had places of business in two counties at any one time,76 it is clear 
that the last event test determined the filing location within the state. 
Unlike the time of filing or time of attachment tests, the adoption 
of the last event test to determine where initially to file leads a court to 
the inescapable conclusion that an ineffective filing can be cured by a 
72. U.C.C. § 9-401, Comment 4 (emphasis added). See Wallach, supra note 68, at 453.54 
(describing the history of Comment 4). 
73. For a discussion of the application and history of U.C.C. Comments, see Greenberg, 
Spec!ftc Performance Under Section 2-716 Of The Uniform Commercial Code: "A More Liberal 
Attitude" in the "Grand Style", 17 NEW ENG. 321, 327-28 (1982). 
74. 614 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1980). 
75. Id. at 404. 
76. Id. at 403 n.2. 
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change in circumstances.77 Since the test adopted to determine initial 
effectiveness of the filing will resolve the issue of cure, it is necessary to 
focus on (1) the benefits, if any, of permitting a financing statement to 
be cured, and (2) which of the three foregoing tests is best suited to 
serving the purpose of the U.C.C. filing system, keeping in mind that 
the answer to this question will necessarily resolve the issue of cure. 
IV. RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM 
A. PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF THE LAST EVENT TEST 
Collateral that is subject to the last event test of U.C.C. section 
9-103(l)(b) is tangible collateral with a relatively permanent situs.78 
Thus, it made perfect sense to adopt a conflict-of-laws rule that pro-
vides that perfection and the effect of perfection be governed by the law 
of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located.79 On its face, such 
a rule seems simple enough. All the secured party must do is determine 
where the collateral is located and then comply with that jurisdiction's 
perfection requirements. Such a rule, though simple, is not satisfac-
tory; the various types of collateral covered by section 9-103(1) have a 
relatively fixed location, but are nevertheless capable of movement. 
The following hypothetical illustrates the problem: 
(5) Both Debtor and Secured Party are located in New York. A 
security agreement is executed and a financing statement is filed in 
New York covering Debtor's inventory of furs. Debtor then moves the 
furs to California. After the furs arrive in California, Secured Party 
then makes the secured loan to Debtor. 
This hypothetical illustrates that it is not enough to simply tell a 
secured party that he must comply with the perfection requirements of 
the state in which the collateral is located. During the period when the 
security interest was being created, the collateral was located first in 
New York and then in California. A secured party needs a rule that 
tells him whether, in such a case, a filing is required in New York, 
California, or in both states. Section 9-103(l)(b) addresses this need by 
combining a temporal test with a location test. The secured party is 
told at what point in time the location of the collateral is to be deter-
77. For a discussion of the last event test and its application to cure, see iefra notes 78-81 
and accompanying text. 
78. U.C.C. § 9-103(1). Ordinary goods are those goods "other than those covered by acer-
tificate of title described in subsection (2), mobile goods described in subsection (3), and minerals 
described in subsection (5).'' U.C.C. § 9-l03(l)(a). 
79. u.c.c. § 9-l03(l)(b). 
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mined. Location is to be determined when "the last event occurs on 
which is based the assertion that the security interest is perfected or 
unperfected."80 
As applied to the foregoing hypothetical, the last event test poses 
little difficulty. Before a security interest is perfected, the following 
four events must occur:81 
(1) the collateral must be in the possession of the secured party pur-
suant to a pledge agreement, or the debtor must have signed a secur-
ity agreement, 82 
(2) value must have been given by the secured party,83 
(3) the debtor must have rights in the collateral, 84 and 
( 4) the collateral must be in the possession of the secured party85 or 
the secured party must have filed a financing statement.86 
In the hypothetical, the last of these four events to occur was the giving 
of value by the secured party. When this event occurred the collateral 
was located in California, so its law governed perfection. Since the 
secured party did not possess the collateral, a financing statement had 
to be filed in California. No statement was filed, so the secured party's 
interest was unperfected. 
The application of the last event test to this hypothetical was sim-
ple because the relevant last event was clearly one of the affirmative 
four steps necessary for perfection.87 What is not so clear, however, is 
whether the relevant last event can be an event other than the four 
above. 88 Only if it can will an ineffective financing statement be cured 
by a change in conditions. 
To illustrate the potential ambiguity of the last event test, Mr. Pe-
ter Coogan posits the following hypothetical: 
80. Id. 
81. See U.C.C. § 9-303(1) ("A security interest is perfected when it has attached and when 
all of the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken."). 
82. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a). 
83. u.c.c. § 9-203(1)(b). 
84. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c). 
85. u.c.c. § 9-305. 
86. u.c.c. § 9-302(1). 
87. R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-5 
(1973); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 968 (1980). 
88. See Coogan, supra note 7, at 539-42 (discussion of last event test ambiguities); Kripke, 
supra note 7, at 61-62 (discussing "misapprehensions" about last event test); R. HENSON, supra 
note 87, at 330 (last event language labeled "infelicitous"); Wallach, supra note 68, at 62-63 (not-
ing conflict between last event test and U.C.C. § 9-401(3)). Haydock, Book Review, 21 WAYNE L. 
REv. 183, 187-89 (1974) (disagreeing with U.C.C. definition of "event"). 
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(6) D and S, both located in Pennsylvania, execute a security 
agreement covering D's inventory, including after-acquired items. S 
makes a large advance and files a financing statement in Penn-
sylvania. . . . Suppose certain after-acquired inventory is to be 
shipped from California and the debtor acquires rights in those goods 
while they are still in California.89 Mr. Coogan correctly asserts that: 
S's filing in Pennsylvania would not protect him before the goods 
arrive there. The last event on which S would have to base his asser-
tion that he had a perfected security interest in the goods before their 
entry into Pennsylvania would be D's acquisition of rights in the col-
lateral. But since the goods were not located in Pennsylvania when 
this event occurred, paragraph (l)(b) tells us that Pennsylvania law 
did not at the time of this event govern perfection, and that, there-
fore, the Pennsylvania filing is ineffective.90 
Mr. Coogan's concern is the status of S's security interest once the 
goods arrive in Pennsylvania. He believes a literal reading of section 9-
103( l){b) supports the following argument: 
[S]ince no "last event" has occurred prior to the entry of the goods 
into Pennsylvania on which could be based a valid assertion that S's 
security interest is perfected, a "last event"-presumably another 
filing-will have to occur after the goods arrive in order for perfec-
tion in Pennsylvania to be good. Since the collateral would be lo-
cated in Pennsylvania when this "last event" occurred, the second 
Pennsylvania filing would be effective. Were the original filing in 
Pennsylvania to become effective upon the collateral's arrival there, 
it could be argued, paragraph 9-103(l)(b) would essentially be mak-
ing the movement of goods into a jurisdiction a sixth step of perfec-
tion-a step not listed in 9-303.91 
This argument assumes that the last event must be one of the statutory 
events required for perfection. Since one of the statutory events neces-
sary for attachment cannot reoccur once the goods arrive in Penn-
sylvania and a statutory event is necessary, the secured party will have 
to create such an event by filing.92 
89. Coogan, supra note 7, at 539. Though the debtor had not received possession of the 
goods, it is still possible that upon contracting for sale the debtor acquired rights in the collateral 
because a buyer obtains a "special property and an insurable interest" in goods by identification 
of existing goods to a contract of sale. U.C.C. § 2-501(1). 
90. Coogan, supra note 7, at 539. 
91. Coogan, supra note 7, at 541 (emphasis in original). 
92. Mr. Coogan suggests that this problem could be avoided if the parties provide in their 
security agreement that the security interest not attach until arrival of the goods in Pennsylvania 
pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-203(2). Id. at 543. Mr. Haydock, in my opinion, correctly refutes this 
position by pointing out that it will not work "because even though the parties agree to delay 
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If such an argument were successful then an ineffective financing 
statement could never be cured. When the debtor in the foregoing hy-
pothetical acquired rights in the after-acquired collateral, the secured 
party's security interest attached to those goods. At that moment, the 
Pennsylvania filing was ineffective to perfect the security interest. Un-
less the movement of the collateral into Pennsylvania constitutes a last 
event, cure is impossible and, as Mr. Coogan points out, a new filing 
would be necessary in Pennsylvania. It is only when the last event for 
purposes of section 9-103(1)(b) is interpreted as any event, which would 
result in the financing statement being effective if then filed, that cure 
becomes possible. 
To limit the last event to one of the statutory events required for 
perfection is "patently absurd."93 According to Professor Kripke such 
an interpretation 
ignores the drafting style of the Code. Had it been the intention to 
limit the category of "last events" to the affirmative five steps re-
quired to perfect a security interest, cross-references to the relevant 
sections would have been made and the same terminology used. But 
this, of course, was not done.94 
Happily, even Mr. Coogan believes that "[s]uch a result could not have 
been intended by the draftsmen and is not dictated by the logic of Arti-
cle 9."95 
'Apart from the fact that the literal wording of the U.C.C. does not 
support such an interpretation, limiting the permissible last event 
would be nonsensical. First, to require a second filing after the goods 
enter Pennsylvania would serve no useful purpose whatsoever. Second, 
such an interpretation would contradict the mandate of the U.C.C. that 
it be interpreted to "simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing 
commercial transactions."96 The secured party, in Mr. Coogan's hypo-
thetical, would constantly have to monitor the debtor's acquisition of 
goods and determine at what point the debtor acquired rights in goods. 
If the debtor first acquired rights in after-acquired goods before their 
entry into Pennsylvania, then the secured party would have to file 
again in Pennsylvania after their entry. Such a requirement would 
attachment until the property is moved into state A, the four events necessary for perfection would 
have in fact occurred." Haydock, supra note 88, at 188. 
93. Haydock, supra note 88, at 188; Kripke, supra note 7, at 63. 
94. Kripke, supra note 7, at 61. 
95. Coogan, supra note 7, at 541. 
96. u.c.c. § 1-102. 
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place an intolerable burden upon the secured party. Ultimately this 
would limit the use of inventory as collateral. 
To further illustrate that the last event should not be so limited 
and that a financing statement should be able to be cured in cases in-
volving interstate movement, consider the following hypothetical: 
(7) Debtor is a national retail chain with stores in all fifty states. 
Secured Party has a security interest in Debtor's inventory. To perfect 
its security interest, Secured Party files in all fifty states. Assume that 
Debtor's store in Pennsylvania runs out of televisions. Debtor then 
moves some televisions from its Delaware store or perhaps a warehouse 
in Delaware to the Pennsylvania store. 
Since Secured Party had filed in Delaware one can assume that it 
had a perfected security interest in the televisions before removal to 
Pennsylvania.97 It is also clear that before removal to Pennsylvania, 
the Pennsylvania filing was ineffective to perfect a security interest in 
the Delaware televisions.98 The question, then, is what happens to Se-
cured Party's perfected security interest once the televisions are re-
moved to Pennsylvania. 
If the relevant last event is an event other than movement of the 
televisions into Pennsylvania, perfection will lapse four months after 
arrival unless Secured Party files a new financing statement in Penn-
sylvania before expiration of that period.99 Since the Secured Party 
will probably be unaware of this transaction, it will not file and its per-
fected security interest in these televisions will lapse after four months. 
If, on the other hand, the movement of the televisions is considered the 
last event, the televisions will be located in Pennsylvania when that 
event occurs. Hence, the law of Pennsylvania will apply. Since Se-
cured Party has filed in Pennsylvania, it will have a perfected security 
interest in the televisions the moment they enter Pennsylvania which 
will not lapse after four months. As to these televisions, the ineffective 
Pennsylvania filing will be cured by the change in circumstances, i.e., 
the movement of the televisions into Pennsylvania. Unless this latter 
interpretation is accepted, a secured party will always run the risk that 
its perfected security interest in inventory will be lost by interstate shuf-
fling of goods by the debtor. Such a result seriously impedes the use of 
inventory as collateral. 
97. See U.C.C. § 9-103 (perfection of security interest in multiple state transactions). 
98. Id. 
99. u.c.c. § 9-103(l)(d). 
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A restrictive view of the last event test penalizes a secured party 
who anticipates a change in the collateral's location and files accord-
ingly. For example, if a debtor notifies the secured party that the col-
lateral will be relocated to another state, the filing in the new state will 
have to await the collateral's arrival. Filing in the new state before the 
collateral's arrival would result in the problems raised by the previous 
two hypotheticals. The secured party would be required to constantly 
monitor the collateral or risk reliance on the debtor's representation to 
determine if and when the collateral is relocated. If, however, the last 
event can be the relocation of the collateral, then pre-filing would be 
feasible. The pre-filed financing statement, initially ineffective, would 
be cured by the relocation of the collateral which becomes the last 
event. It is this view that permits an ineffective filing to be cured by 
interstate relocation; it is doubtful if any other view of the last event 
test can be justified. 
As discussed previously, three tests exist for the purpose of estab-
lishing the time at which the secured party must determine the proper 
place to file under section 9-401(1): the time of filing test, the time of 
attachment test, and the last event test. 100 But only the last event test is 
flexible enough to permit cure and then only if the relevant last event 
can be an event other than one of the statutory events required for 
perfection. The last event test is used to determine the proper state in 
which to file pursuant to section 9-103(l)(b). There is no reason to 
limit the permissible last event when the test is used to determine where 
in a state to file pursuant to section 9-401(1). 
B. AVAILABLE TESTS AND FILING PURPOSES 
Because only the last event test permits cure, arguments critical of its 
use must be examined. Nonapplication of the last event test would be 
justified if it failed to serve the purpose of filing 101 or unduly burdened 
the secured party. 102 
100. See supra text accompanying notes 67-77. 
10 I. The accepted purpose of filing is to enable a third pany to obtain information concern· 
ing interests created by the debtor. See U.C.C. § 9-401, Official Comment 3 ("The policy of the 
subsection is to require filing in the place or places where a creditor would normally look for 
information concerning interests created by the debtor."). 
102. See Kripke, supra note 7, at 63-65 (convenience of the secured pany in determining 
where to file was an imponant consideration in drafting the U.C.C.). 
Although the secured party's convenience is an imponant criterion, it should not necessarily 
mandate a panicular rule when countervailing considerations exist, as recognized by Professor 
Wallach who states: 
[T]he last event test may compel the secured pany to contact the debtor or otherwise 
determine the facts when he would not otherwise have had to do so. The slightly in-
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In Hammons the court believed that: 
By requiring that the determination of the proper place to file be 
made at the time when the last event occurs upon which the perfec-
tion of the creditor's security interest is based, the last event rule en-
sures that the place in which the filing is made and the contents of 
the filing will reflect any changes made by the debtor between the 
time of attachment and the time of filing, regardless of which came 
first. The filing would be more likely to reflect the location and sta-
tus of the debtor which exists at the time a subsequent creditor is 
searching the records to determine what prior security interests have 
been perfected against the debtor and therefore will be more likely to 
be found by such a subsequent creditor. 103 
This view has been adopted by Professor Wallach who states that, "The 
test best suited to serving the purpose of filing is a last event test or last 
to occur test . . . ." 104 Though the "last event" test is perhaps the best 
of the three tests, its real value arises only when the issue of cure is 
considered. 
It is suggested that for the purpose of giving notice to a third party, 
it matters little which test is adopted. For example, assume that in or-
der to perfect its security interest the secured party must file in County 
A, the county of the debtor's residence. The security interest attaches 
when the debtor resides in County A. The debtor subsequently moves 
to County B. The time of attachment rule would require that a filing 
be made in County A. Since it would be impossible for a prospective 
creditor to determine the debtor's residence at the time a security inter-
est may have attached, to be safe the creditor must search the records of 
each county in which the debtor lived during the life of the collateral. 
The potential unreliability of a debtor's representation regarding resi-
dency requires that the creditor check the records of every county 
within the state. 
Similarly, an extensive search also would be required if the time of 
filing test were adopted. Since the U.C.C. permits a secured party to 
file prior to attachment, 105 a filing would be proper under this test if 
made in the county of the debtor's residence regardless of whether, 
before the security interest attaches, the debtor acquires a residence in a 
creased burden this requirement places on the secured party is justified by the greater 
likelihood that subsequent parties will discover the financing statement during their 
search of the files. 
Wallach, supra note 68, at 453. 
103. 614 F.2d at 405 (footnote omitted). 
104. Wallach, supra note 68, at 453. 
105. u.c.c. §§ 9-402(1), -303. 
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different county. A prospective creditor, again unwilling to rely on the 
debtor's representation regarding residency, would have to check the 
records of every county within the state. 
The burden on the prospective creditor is not significantly lessened 
by adoption of the last event test. Though it is true that the filing will 
reflect any change in debtor's residency between the time of attachme~t 
and the time of filing, the prospective creditor cannot determine where 
the debtor resided when the last event occurred. So, once again, a 
search of the records of every county is necessary. 
In determining which test best reduces the filing burden on the 
secured party, it is interesting to note that essentially the same argu-
ment has been advanced in favor of both the time of filing test and time 
of attachment test. The argument in favor of adopting the time of filing 
test is that a filing should not be rendered ineffective by a change in 
circumstances between the time of filing and the subsequent attach-
ment. 106 The argument in favor of the time of attachment test is that 
the time the security interest attaches occurs "on the occasion of the 
final contact or communication between the parties to the transaction, 
thereby affording a final opportunity for careful verification." 107 Each 
argument, however, assumes that the transaction between the debtor 
and creditor proceeds in a particular order. Unfortunately, this is not 
the case. If filing precedes attachment, the time of attachment test re-
quires that the secured party remain alert to changes between filing and 
attachment. If attachment precedes filing, the secured party must re-
main alert to changes between the time of attachment and filing. 
Hence, neither the time of filing test nor the time of attachment test is 
inherently superior. 108 
The burden of alertness imposed upon the secured party by the 
time of filing test or the time of attachment test is neither necessarily 
reduced nor increased by the last event test. Professor Kripke, arguing 
in favor of the time of filing test, states that "the imposition, under a 
last event test, of a duty to remain alert after filing to intrastate remov-
als is a burden that cannot be justified."109 This assumes, however, that 
filing precedes attachment. If filing occurs after attachment, the burden 
106. W. WILLIER & F. HART, 6G U.C.C. REPORTER-DIGEST 2-1935, 2-1938, 39 (1969). 
107. Jn re Pelletier, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 327, 332 (S.D. Me. 1968). 
I 08. A creditor, however, would be wise to take the necessary steps for perfection, if possible, 
before the security interest attaches. The security interest cannot attach until the creditor gives 
value; therefore, value should be withheld until the creditor is certain of his priority. See supra 
text accompanying notes 81-86. 
109. Kripke, supra note 7, at 69. 
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on the secured party will remain the same under the time of filing test 
or last event test because the time of filing will be the last event. Simi-
larly, the burden on the secured party will be identical regardless of 
whether the time of attachment test or the last event test is used unless 
attachment precedes filing. If attachment occurs after filing, the mo-
ment the security interest attaches will be when the last event occurs. 
The last event test, therefore, is identical to the other tests when deter-
mining the effect on the secured party's burden of alertness; increases 
or decreases in the burden on the secured party depend solely on the 
order in which the transaction proceeds. Even if it could be shown that 
a burden results from application of the last event test, it is slight. Pro-
fessor Kripke admits that a change of circumstances, making the filing 
ineffective and occurring between the time of filing and the time of 
attachment, would be unlikely to occur. 110 Also, any slightly increased 
burden is more than justified because only the last event test permits an 
ineffective filing to be cured. 
C. BENEFITS OF ALLOWING CURE 
A number of benefits are gained by the adoption of a filing rule al-
lowing cure. It has long been a legal axiom that one should not be 
required to perform a purposeless act. 111 If cure is not permitted, a 
secured party would be required to refile a financing statement for the 
sole reason that the first filing was "initially" ineffective. The question 
remains whether such a requirement serves any valid purpose. 
Perhaps a valid purpose for requiring a second filing can be gath-
ered from the effect of such a rule. First, the secured party, upon refil-
ing, might have a second stamp placed upon the original statement by 
once again paying the filing fee. At least one court has recognized that 
"such a requirement would be to simply ignore the realities of life and 
the intent and purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code." 112 These-
cured party could simply file a new financing statement. 113 Second, 
refiling would put any third party on notice that the original filing, 
when made, was ineffective. Clearly, no useful reason exists for putting 
third parties on notice of this fact. 114 A third possible consequence of 
such a rule would be that the secured party, if there is no refiling, re-
110. Id. 
111. See U.C.C. § 3-511, Official Co=ent 7 (excusing presentment, protest, or notice of dis-
honor of commercial paper when to require it would serve no useful purpose). 
112. Genoa Nat'l Bank v. Sorensen, 208 Neb. 423, 428, 304 N.W.2d 659, 662 (1981). 
113. Haydock, supra note 88, at 188-89. 
114. See id. at 189 ("Obviously, this [third party notice] would serve no useful purpose."). 
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mains unperfected. No commercial justification exists, however, for 
relegating the secured party to the permanent status of "unperfected." 
Since a third party would assume that the original filing was in the 
correct office, he would undoubtedly check that office for filings against 
the debtor and would discover the secured party's filing. Thus, the 
original filing would fulfill the U.C.C. purpose by giving "constructive 
notice to the world and actual notice to those who would take the 
trouble to look."115 
A rule prohibiting cure, therefore, cannot be justified by its conse-
quences. In fact, the consequences support the argument in favor of 
cure since they eliminate the need to perform useless acts that poten-
tially prejudice secured parties. 
Other advantages exist for permitting cure. In re Kalamazoo Steel 
Process, Inc. , 116 although not a case involving cure, illustrates one of 
these benefits. In that case, the secured party knew at the time the se-
curity agreement was executed that the debtor intended to change its 
name. The financing statement, however, did not reflect the antici-
pated name change. The court, relying on the U.C.C. imposed duty of 
good faith, 117 held that 
[w]hen a secured party has knowledge at the time the security agree-
ment is executed that the debtor intends to change its name, and the 
new name is known to him, the secured party must act in good faith 
to insure that the filing under the Code not only discloses the current 
and correct name of the debtor but also reflects the pending name 
change of which the parties are aware. 118 
To accomplish this, the court suggested that the original financing 
statement be drafted to indicate the contemplated name change by in-
cluding both the debtor's current name and the anticipated name. 119 
Implicit in such a suggestion is the court's acceptance of the cure doc-
trine. If a statement with only the anticipated name were filed, it 
clearly would be an ineffective filing because of the absence of the 
debtor's actual name, and thus, the financing statement would be seri-
ously misleading. The statement would only become effective and, 
hence, cured when the debtor changed its name. The name change 
would be the last event. If cure were not recognized in such a case, the 
secured party would be required to wait until after the name change to 
ll5. Genoa Nat'! Bank v. Sorensen, 208 Neb. 423, 427, 304 N.W.2d 659, 662 (1981). 
116. 503 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1974). 
117. u.c.c. § 1-203. 
118. 503 F.2d at 1222. 
ll9. Id. at 1222-23. 
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file. Such a requirement would pose serious difficulties for the secured 
party, as in the case of interstate relocation of collateral. 120 The se-
cured party would have to constantly monitor the collateral or rely on 
the debtor's representation as to when the name change occurs. 121 
The problem of an anticipatory refiling also arises in those states 
that have adopted the alternative section 9-401(3). 122 Only if cure is 
recognized can a secured party safely file in advance of a change that 
would necessitate a refiling. Thus, to recognize and allow anticipatory 
refiling is the only sensible position. 
The problem of cure raised by an anticipatory refiling is not iden-
tical to the issue of cure raised in In re G. G. Moss Co. 123 and Soren-
sen. 124 When the issue arises because of an anticipatory refiling, it is 
assumed that the initial filing was originally effective under the test 
used by the particular jurisdiction. It is therefore theoretically possible 
for a court to adopt the time of filing test or time of attachment test for 
initial perfection, but to permit cure of an anticipatory refiling never-
theless, even though the initial filing could never be cured. Such a po-
sition, though theoretically possible, is logically inconsistent. It would 
be anomalous to hold that an initially improper filing remains ineff ec-
tive no matter what subsequently occurs, but that an anticipatory refil-
ing, ineffective and not required when made, can nevertheless be cured 
and become effective by a subsequent change in conditions. Unless 
courts adopt the last event test to determine initial perfection, which 
would permit cure, one of two results will follow: first, for logical con-
sistency courts will refuse to recognize and give effect to an anticipatory 
120. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99. 
121. This problem can be particularly acute if the secured party intends to claim a security 
interest in the property acquired by the debtor after the execution of the security agreement. 
U.C.C. § 9-402(7) provides that: 
Where the debtor so changes his name or in the case of an organization its name, identity 
or corporate structure that a filed financing statement becomes seriously misleading, the 
filing is not effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor 
more than four months after the change, unless a new appropriate financing statement is 
filed before the expiration of that time. 
122. U.C.C. § 9-401 (Alternative Subsec. (3)) states that: 
A filing which is made in the proper county continues effective for four months after a 
change to another county of the debtor's residence or place of business or the location of 
the collateral, whichever controlled the original filing. It becomes ineffective thereafter 
unless a copy of the financing statement signed by the secured party is filed in the new 
county within said period. The security interest may also be perfected in the new county 
after the expiration of the four-month period; in such case perfection dates from the time 
of perfection in the new county. A change in the use of the collateral does not impair the 
effectiveness of the original filing. 
123. See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text. 
124. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
1274 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1247 
refiling; or, second, courts must abandon all logical consistency and 
give effect to anticipatory refiling. Neither of these results is desirable. 
D. JUDICIAL GLOSS To PREVENT UNDESIRABLE RESULTS 
Although it is urged here that courts adopt the last event test for the 
purpose of testing the effectiveness of a financing statement, its applica-
tion can create a statutory interpretation problem that should be 
addressed. 
The case of In re Miller is illustrative. 125 If the court had explicitly 
ruled that the lapsed filing by the credit company had been cured when 
the collateral was returned to California, the priority contest between 
the credit company and the lender would be a contest between two 
perfected parties. Since both parties' interests were perfected by filing, 
priority would be determined pursuant to U.C.C. section 9-312(5)(a). 126 
If that section were applied literally the credit company would have 
priority since it had originally filed before the lender. 127 Such a result, 
however, seems clearly unjust and would certainly come as a surprise 
to the lender. If the collateral had remained in Oregon, the lender's 
security interest would have had priority since it would have been per-
fected, whereas the credit company's security interest would have been 
unperfected. When the collateral was returned to California, the 
lender followed the mandate of the U.C.C. and refiled there. 128 Why, 
then, should the lender lose its priority when it did everything required 
by the U.C.C. to maintain priority? The answer is that the lender 
should not lose its priority. To prevent such a result, section 9-312(5) 
must receive a thin coating of judicial gloss. 129 
The theory behind the "first to file or perfect" rule of section 9-
125. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text. 
126. Although Miller was decided under the Old Code§ 9-312(5), the 1972 revisions to that 
section would change neither the result nor the analysis which follows. 
127. 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1043; U.C.C. § 9-312(5). The credit company had 
filed in California prior to April I, 1973 while the goods were located within that state. The lender 
filed in Oregon on April 30, 1973 and in California on December JO, 1973. 
128. 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1043. 
129. Professor Kripke is aware of the limitations ofU.C.C. § 9-312 when there are interstate 
complications. He suggests that 
the first-to-file rule of revised section 9-312(5)(a) should be limited to filings which have 
inunediate territorial effect on the collateral concerned. Otherwise, when the collateral 
moves into the territorial reach of a filing, that filing should be deemed to date from the 
time of entry, and the filing in the origination state should Jiave the benefit of tile contin-
uous perfection concept. 
Kripke, supra note 7, at 59. See also B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER 
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE~ 3.8(4] (1980) (illustrating limitations on the first to file rule 
when two debtors are involved). 
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312(5) is that the second secured party, before making a loan to the 
debtor, could have found any prior secured party's competing interest 
by checking the public files, or by investigating the reason for the 
debtor's lack of possession of the collateral. 130 Whenever a financing 
statement is found to be cured, it inevitably follows that the filing was 
ineffective prior to the event or events resulting in cure. Regardless of 
the basis for the financing statement's ineffectiveness, the fact that it 
was ineffective means that it would not put an interested third party on 
notice of the prior security interest. Under most circumstances, there-
fore, an ineffective filing is equivalent to the complete absence of any 
filing.13 1 Consequently, an ineffective financing statement should be 
treated as if no filing had occurred during its period of ineffectiveness. 
A secured party should not be permitted to rely on the date of the inef-
fective filing for the purpose of establishing priority under section 9-
312(5). The date of cure, therefore, should be considered to be the date 
of filing. This approach, applied to the facts of Miller, would result in 
the lender having priority over the credit company. The lender's filing 
date would be the date of the Oregon filing which would be continued 
by a timely refiling in California. The credit company's filing date 
would be the date upon which the collateral was returned to California, 
ie., the date of cure. 
The courts should apply section 9-312(5) in the manner suggested 
because of the inequities that result from a literal application of that 
section. Only by using the suggested approach can a court allow for 
cure without upsetting the order of priority intended by the U.C.C.'s 
drafters. 
CONCLUSION 
The possibility of an ineffective financing statement being cured by a 
subsequent change in conditions depends on the test adopted for deter-
mining initial ineffectiveness. Both the time of filing test and the time 
of attachment test preclude the opportunity for cure, because both re-
quire a determination of effectiveness at a particular point in time. The 
last event test, however, if properly interpreted, is flexible enough to 
accommodate the concept of cure since the event resulting in cure 
would be the last event upon which the perfection of the security inter-
est is based. 
This Article demonstrates that if cure is excluded from considera-
130. B. CLARK, supra note 129, at ~ 3.8(1]. 
131. See supra note 4. 
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tion, it matters little which of the three tests a court chooses to adopt. 
But when the benefits of permitting cure are considered, the choice of 
tests becomes crucial. The last event test should be chosen simply be-
cause it allows for cure. Furthermore, by adopting a flexible approach 
to the first to file rule of section 9-312(5), cure will not disrupt third 
party expectations. Although a number of courts have flirted with the 
issue of cure, few were aware of doing so. It is hoped that this Article 
will help create such an awareness. 132 
132. The U.C.C. only recognizes the concept of "cure" in an entirely different context. See. 
e.g., U.C.C. § 2-508 (rejected delivery due to nonconformity may be "cured" with a conforming 
delivery). 
